世界哲学日 | 《哲学动态》精选双语文章推荐

哲学入门《苏菲的世界》 #生活乐趣# #阅读乐趣# #好书推荐#

联合国教科文组织将每年11月份的第三个星期四定为“世界哲学日”(World Philosophy Day)。其目的是鼓励世界各国人民分享他们的哲学遗产，使我们更加深地了解哲学知识，认识哲学学科，并使得更多人在日常生活中感受体悟哲学的魅力和内涵，使得哲学真正走进我们每个人的生活，更好地促进人类社会的发展。本期精选发表于《哲学动态》的5篇双语文章，让我们一起读读哲学，感受哲学的独特魅力吧！

✦文章推荐✦

01

常识世界中的生命意识

Life consciousness in the world of common-sense

【摘要】常识是人们广泛认同并得到检验的信念。常识在社会生活实践中得以形成并受到检验，这决定了人民群众是常识的主体。人类在生命活动中形成“我”的生命意识，“要活下去”和“要过好日子”的信念概括了人类生存意识和生活意识的最终追求，成为两个最具普遍性的常识。我们可以把常识划分为“与感觉和知觉相联系的常识”和“与观念相联系的常识”,后者包括“知识类型的常识”和“价值观念类型的常识”。社会生活的实践本质决定了“与目的形成相联系的价值观念类型的常识”比“与方法形成相联系的知识类型的常识”更为重要。同人生最根本的“利害”相联系的“要活下去”和“要过好日子”的信念是常识世界的核心。人文精神作为追求自由的主体意识，既是最具有影响力的社会价值观念，也是由历史唯物主义诠释了的“世界精神”。作为常识世界核心的生命意识是人文精神内核的集中体现，这代表了唯物史观的基本态度。人文精神通过常识世界中的生命意识，以集体意识的方式、“共鸣”的方式、“范式”的方式和归宿感的方式成为人文精神发挥作用的机制。一方面，我们要尊重常识，认识到“事出反常必有妖”。对于以生命意识为核心的常识世界的敬畏，在某种意义上具有崇高的信仰意味。另一方面，我们还要善于对常识予以批判，不能把常识等同于广泛认同的信念，要研究常识适用的范围，辩证地对待常识的坚执性。

【Abstract】The answer to what common sense is seems to be very “common sense.” However, familiarity is not true knowledge. Common sense is often mistakenly equated with widely known beliefs. In social life, people often have actions and events that despise, violate, or even trample on common sense. These actions and events have serious consequences on social life. This determines that it is of practical significance to think about common sense from the depth of life consciousness. Common sense is a widely shared and tested belief. Common sense is formed and tested in the practice of social life with the people as the main body. This determines that the masses are the subject of common sense. Human beings form the life consciousness of “me” in life activities, and the belief of “to live” and “to live a good life” summarizes the ultimate pursuit of survival consciousness and life consciousness. These two common senses become the most universal ones. Common sense can be divided into “common sense associated with feelings and perceptions” and “common sense associated with ideas.” The latter includes “common sense of knowledge types” and “common sense of value types.” In social life, the formation of practical purposes is linked to the common sense of the type of values. This determines that common sense of the types of values associated with the formation of practical purposes is more important than the common sense of the types of knowledge associated with the formation of methods. Human beings follow the law of “seeking benefits and avoiding harm” in a high-level way. The common senses of “to live” and “to live a good life” are related to the most fundamental “benefits” and “harm” of life. This determines that these two common senses become the core of the value-type common sense, and thus become the core of the entire common-sense world. The humanistic spirit is the subjective consciousness that pursues freedom, and it is the most influential social value. The humanistic spirit is the “world spirit” interpreted by historical materialism. The two common senses of “to live” and “to live a good life” are the concentrated embodiment of the core of the humanistic spirit, and have become the basic views derived from this materialist view of history. The humanistic spirit exerts the “unlimited power of the universe” through the life consciousness in the common-sense world and in the way of collective consciousness, the way of “resonance,” the way of “paradigm,” and the way of belonging. On the one hand, we need to respect common sense. Respect for the common-sense world with life consciousness as the core is reverence for life consciousness. Common sense can only be respected and followed, and it cannot be disdained, violated, or even trampled on. Common sense that embodies the life consciousness has a noble meaning of faith. As the saying goes, “When things go wrong, there will be demons.” Our correct attitude is to reveal the “demon” in the “abnormal” actors and the “abnormal” social objects; otherwise, it will be “a ghost and a disaster.” On the other hand, we must also criticize common sense. Common sense cannot be equated with widely shared beliefs. It is necessary to study the scope of the application of common sense and to dialectically treat the persistence of common sense.

02

儒学修身的特质及审美——以《诗经·卫风·淇澳》为中心的讨论

The characteristics and aesthetics of self-cultivation in Confucianism: a discussion centered around “Qi Yu” in Shijing (The Book of Poetry)

【摘要】孔子从周，以传承文王之“文”为使命。“文”既指外在的礼乐制度、道德典范，亦指内在的於穆缄渊，两者通过“体用一源”得以统合。卫武公传承文王之学，《诗经·卫风·淇澳》呈现了其修身的特质及君子之美，借此可以蠡测文王之“文”及证成。《淇澳》以绿竹猗猗、青青、如箦象征修身的三个阶段，在成就有德君子时，亦伴有三个阶段的美；内外兼修，身体既是审美的客体，亦是审美的主体，在审美过程中实现主客统一。《论语》引《淇澳》首章，展现出修身的内发与外令、方向性与无限性、道德优先与审美“退场”。《大学》引《淇澳》首章，侧重修身的起点，呈现修身的内、外两个向度，在方向性与无限性基础上，以三个“不忘”来表现阶段性目标实现。《淇澳》展现的修身特质有：承认起点的个体差异性，由此决定功夫的进路以及终点的集成。修身包括个体发展的两个阶段：“即凡而圣”与“即圣而凡”,从而分别成就“小身子”与“大身子”;改变内在品质，以接近文王之德之纯。《淇澳》修身体现出个性之美与集成之美、仁之美与敬畏之美的统合，具有道德与审美的双重面向，后世儒学在继承时，有道德抑制代替审美的倾向。回望周代修身文化，有助于理解德美合一，对于激活儒学的艺术精神主体具有重要意义。

【Abstract】Currently, studies have been carried out on self-cultivation, a key component of Confucianism, in the field of Confucianism of pre-Qing dynasties and neo-Confucianism of Song and Ming dynasties. Based on these studies, self-cultivation can be traced back to the Zhou Dynasty and linked to studies on aesthetics. Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, thought highly of the cultural prosperity of the Zhou Dynasty and considered passing on the culture established by Emperor Wen of the Zhou dynasty as one of his missions. Culture (文), refers to not only ritual and music systems and moral code, which are the extrinsic factors, but also individual’s aesthetics and knowledge, which are the intrinsic factors, with the former embodying and integrating with the latter. However, as relevant literature is rare, information about the specific process adopted by Emperor Wen of the Zhou Dynasty to justify intrinsic self-cultivation is insufficient. As a result, scholars of later dynasties only knew what intrinsic self-cultivation was without knowing the logic behind it. Fortunately, before Confucius’ time, Duke Wu of the Wei Kingdom passed on the ideas of Emperor Wen of the Zhou Dynasty. Qi Yu in Odes of Wei of the Book of Poetry (hereinafter referred to as Qi Yu) explains the features of self-cultivation and beauty of a gentleman. It is considered one of the classics relating to self-cultivation during the Zhou Dynasty and provides some insights into the culture established and justified by Emperor Wen of the Zhou Dynasty. Qi Yu contains three chapters, wherein three stages of the lifecycle of green bamboo, namely, the young and soft stage, the lush green stage, and well densely established stage, are used to symbolize the three stages of self-cultivation, indicating that before a man becomes a gentleman of virtues through self-cultivation, he portrays his beauty in three stages, too. By combining extrinsic and intrinsic self-cultivation, a man is both an object and a subject of aesthetics at the same time, integrating the former with the latter. The content about self-cultivation and aesthetics in Qi Yu has profound influences on Confucianism, which is demonstrated by some classic Confucian works, including The Analects (论语) and Da Xue (大学). The first chapter of Qi Yu is quoted in The Analects to show the intrinsic/extrinsic drive, direction, unlimitedness, moral priorities, and aesthetic withdrawal of self-cultivation. Also quoting the first chapter of Qi Yu, Da Xue focuses on the starting point of self-cultivation, discusses the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of self-cultivation, and argues that the milestones of a man’s self-cultivation are reached if the public, including villains and gentlemen, remember this man’s virtue after he passes away based on the direction and unlimitedness of self-cultivation. When scholars tried to interpret Da Xue later, Zhen Xuan and Zhu Xi developed two schools of thoughts about self-cultivation. Zhen emphasized intrinsic self-cultivation, which influenced Yangmingism, while Zhu emphasized extrinsic self-cultivation. The three chapters of Qi Yu show self-cultivation is characterized by the acknowledgement of the differences between individuals at the starting point, which determines the approach taken by an individual for self-cultivation and the achievement achieved by the individual at the end point of self-cultivation. Self-cultivation also includes two stages during the development of an individual: namely, “the secular as sacred” and “the sacred as secular,” through which an individual who practices self-cultivation can establish not only his own, but also someone else’s virtue. Self-cultivation changes the intrinsic features of an individual, through which an individual will be more likely to reach the moral and virtue standards held by Emperor Wen of the Zhou Dynasty. Qi Yu shows that self-cultivation can be reflected by the integration of personality and collectiveness as well as the integration of benevolence and awe, and that self-cultivation consists of the development of virtue and aesthetics. However, when Confucianism was passed on to later generations, emphasis on the development of an individual’s virtue tended to suppress or replace the development of the individual’s aesthetics. A review of the self-cultivation culture of the Zhou Dynasty can help to integrate the development of virtue with that of aesthetics, which has important implications for reviving the artistic and spiritual elements of Confucianism.

03

从真诚出发：诚实、真相与谎言——兼论如何理解谎言禁令及其相关概念

Starting from sincerity: honesty, truth, and lie, with an understanding of the prohibition on lying and its related concepts

【摘要】真诚、诚实、真话与真相等概念，对理解什么是谎言以及谎言禁令具有重要意义。真诚是诚实的必要条件，是“择善而固执之者也”;诚实是真诚地说真话；真话意味着真诚的言者相信自己所言为真；但是，真话并非必然能够通达真相或真理。真诚是真诚-诚实-真话-真相（或真理）系列概念中的核心，具有至关重要的基础意义。应该被严格禁止的谎言内在地包含欺骗意图、自利动机与虚假陈述。某些特殊情境中的“不真实”话语并未包含自利动机，其道德价值与包含这一要素的谎言有所不同。

【Abstract】This study seeks to clarify the connotation and extension of lies and related concepts (sincerity, honesty, and lying), and on this basis, discuss the following questions: what is the difference and connection between sincerity and honesty? Does honesty mean that what is said is the truth? What are the categories of “untrue” in the discourse? The core of sincerity is the cognition and insistence of good (“to choose and insist on good”). Therefore, sincerity must be based on goodwill. The difference between sincerity and honesty is very subtle, but it can also be clarified: Sincerity is a necessary condition for honesty, but not a sufficient condition. Without sincerity, there is no honesty, and with sincerity, there is not necessarily honesty. According to the mutual adverse relationship between the necessary conditions and sufficient conditions, sincerity is the necessary condition of honesty, so honesty is the sufficient condition of sincerity. The concepts of sincerity, honesty, and truth are of great significance to understanding the concept of lies and the prohibition of lies. Sincerity is the necessary condition of honesty, and sincerity is “to choose and insist on good”. Honesty means that a person is sincere in telling the truth and that the person believes that his or her statements are true. However, telling the truth does not mean that the teller’s statements are the truth of the objective meaning. An honest person speaks the statements because he or she is convinced that the statements are true, but the statements still may not be the truth. Sincerity is the core of the sincerity-honesty-truth (or facts) relationship, which has fundamental significance. In all kinds of “untrue” statements, lies that should be strictly prohibited inherently contain deceptive intent, self-interest motive, and false statements. The “untrue” statement in a special situation does not contain the self-interest motive, and its moral value is different from the lie that contains this element. In general, people praise sincerity and honesty, and they are deeply disgusted with lying. However, in some situations, people will also choose not to tell the truth to deal with special dilemmas based on moral emotion and value intuition. From the perspective of evolution, lies, as a strategy in the survival struggle, especially for the weak, has an important survival value. There are similar situations in the real world: vulnerable groups and even ordinary people face evil and disaster. Whether vulnerable groups should follow the strict moral rules that will limit their self-protection and rescue measures requires careful consideration. This fact is an important premise that moral philosophy cannot avoid and should not avoid, and it is also a core problem that should be considered repeatedly.

04

良知如何呈现：经验知识的解释进路及其反思——以“体知”与“动力之知”为例

An explanatory approach concerning experiential knowledge of how conscience presents: taking embodied knowing and knowing-to as examples

【摘要】从“四端之心”开始，以经验知识的解释进路来叩问良知之存在、表述良知之呈现，存在着一条值得被注意的哲学史发展脉络。通过简要梳理这一哲学史源流，并特别说明杜维明、黄勇在回应西方哲学的基础上分别提出的“体知”与“动力之知”理论，我们可以认为，以经验知识的进路解释良知如何呈现，需要以良知不学而能的先天性与其呈现于经验中的差异性、多样性为前提，给予“经验知识如何触发良知”和“良知如何运用经验知识”两个核心问题以有效的解释。同时，认知能力的提高与经验知识的积累都影响了主体对当下道德场景的把握，从而也参与到良知直下的判断中。

【Abstract】Traditional Confucianism has always emphasized the outward manifestation of conscience in practice. Since Mencius illustrated the existence of “four sprouts” through his anecdote about witnessing a child falling into a well, Confucians have often demonstrated the appearance of conscience through specific experiences and guided moral practices. It can be argued that within Confucian philosophy, there exists a developmental trajectory that explores the nature of conscience and expresses its manifestation through empirical knowledge. However, when it comes to the influence of “conscience” on human behavior or its role in specific actions, as well as its interaction with existing empirical knowledge, further elucidation is required. Meanwhile, influenced by Western ethics and epistemology, modern Confucian scholars have a new way of interpreting the “outward manifestation of conscience”. Representatives of these scholars are Du Weiming’s “embodied knowing” and Huang Yong’s “knowing to”, which choose to return to the internal experience of the subject and verify the role of “conscience” in practice. This can be called a returning empirical interpreted approach of the “outward manifestation of conscience”. As for “embodied knowing”, the outward manifestation of conscience is a kind of dynamic “creation and transformation”, and the subject’s innate endowment dynamically transcends and reshapes the empirical knowledge, which is “internalizing the external world”. In this process of “creation and transformation”, the subject’s innate endowments such as sensibility, rationality, intelligence and divinity show as “knowledge” abilities such as “compassion, rational thinking, intuition, and communication with the divine”, which together promote the deepening of “embodied knowledge”; additionally, the subject constantly internalizes the empirical world such as “individual internality, individual and others, individual and community, as well as individual and natural world” through different realms such as body, mind, intuition, and divinity, and forms the expansion of “embodied (knowledge)”, which corresponds to the maturity of the outward manifestation of conscience. As for “knowing to”, the “psychological motivation” generated by conscience is universal on the one hand as one of the many emotions of the action subject at the moment, and on the other hand whether it can become the guide of the final action depends on whether the subject still relies on conscience for choice. At the same time, “knowing to” emphasizes that conscience has two important characteristics besides the knowledge form of “propositional knowledge”: providing the “inner tendency” driven by emotion, namely, the so-called “guide” (push and guide); the universal and mandatory “choice”, which is close to “norms” (norms and laws). By briefly sorting out the philosophical history of the outward manifestation of conscience, this paper believes that to explain how conscience appears by the approach of empirical knowledge, we should take the congenital nature of conscience without learning and its differences and diversity in experience as the premise, and provide an effective explanation to the two core questions of “how empirical knowledge triggers conscience” and “how conscience uses empirical knowledge”. This paper also believes that the improvement of cognitive ability and the accumulation of empirical knowledge both affect the subject’s grasp of the current moral scene, and thus participate in the direct judgment of conscience.

05

记忆与遗忘：宋明理学道德修养工夫论的内在张力

Memory and forgetting: the intrinsic tension in the Song-Ming Neo-Confucian moral cultivation Kung Fu theory

【摘要】记忆与遗忘构成了宋明理学道德修养工夫论中的内在张力。理学家对道德本体之记忆与修养工夫之遗忘的两层划分，有助于厘清其间的纠葛。本体记忆在经验层面的过去、现在、未来三个时间维度展现自身，并决定了经验层记忆内容的变异。由于经验中包括记忆在内的体验活动具有指向性（指向时间中的外物）、属我性（归属于自我）等特征，理学家在讨论遗忘工夫时，从“忘我”和“忘物”两个向度展开。他们通过解构经验层的自我和将道德自觉提升到前反思的直觉状态两种方式，获得“遗忘”的直接性，又通过对道德习性的培养获得本体记忆的道德主宰性，从而巧妙地解决了道德意识直接性与清晰性（主宰性）的冲突。

【Abstract】This study aims to deeply explore the Gongfu of forgetting in Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties and the characteristics of Confucian moral intuition, discovering the consciousness structure and occurrence process from the perspective of the phenomenology of memory, and thus promoting the in-depth study of the Gongfu theory in Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. At present, the research on the Gongfu theory of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties has not paid special attention to this topic, and the research on forgetting is mainly focused on the philosophy of pre-Qin Taoism. That is extremely disproportionate to the important position of forgetting in the Gongfu theory of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. The importance of forgetting is not only reflected in the many discussions and viewpoints of Neo-Confucianism scholars, but also in the Confucian approach that contains a solution to the problem of phenomenology of consciousness. The scope of the topics covered in this paper includes different Neo-Confucianists’ understanding of the memory of moral noumenon and the Gongfu of forgetting, the differences between the memory and forgetting of moral noumenon and those in a general psychological sense, and their empirical manifestations, as well as how Neo-Confucianists understand self-forgetfulness and object forgetfulness. The research conclusion of this paper suggests that there is a divergence in the understanding of forgetting among Neo-Confucianists in the Song and Ming dynasties, which is essentially a question of whether the clarity and directness of moral consciousness can be balanced. The directness of moral consciousness requires the removal of interference from reflective consciousness, and once this happens, it will lead to the loss of clarity and dominance of moral consciousness. Neo-Confucianists have successfully resolved the tension and contradiction between self-forgetfulness and object forgetfulness. The main viewpoint of this study is that the two-layer division of the memory on moral noumenon and the Gongfu of forgetting by Neo-Confucianists helps to clarify the entanglement of issues between them. The memory on noumenon exhibits itself in the three temporal dimensions of the past, present, and future at the experiential level, and determines the variation of the experiential memory content. Due to the intentionality (pointing to external objects) and self-belonging (belonging to oneself) of conscious activities including memory, when discussing the Gongfu of forgetting, Neo-Confucianists also expand from two dimensions: self-forgetfulness and object forgetfulness. They obtain the immediacy of forgetting by deconstructing the self of the experiential layer and elevating moral consciousness to the intuitive state of pre-reflection. They also acquire the moral dominance of the memory on noumenon through the cultivation of moral habits, thus cleverly solving the conflict between the immediacy and clarity (dominance) of moral consciousness. The innovation of this study is reflected in the following aspects. (1) It focuses on the theme of forgetting, which is overlooked by Neo-Confucianism researchers, and conducts in-depth research on the different perspectives and internal logic of Neo-Confucianism on this topic. (2) It uses the phenomenology of memory method to analyze the relationship between memory and forgetting at the levels of experience and noumenon. (3) It analyzes the conscious structure and process of the Gongfu of self-forgetfulness and object forgetfulness. This study is conducive to promoting the further refinement of the study of the Gongfu theory in Neo-Confucianism during the Song and Ming dynasties, and has certain value for academic exchange among researchers.

✦期刊推荐✦

《哲学动态》创办于1963年，是哲学专业的动态性、资料性学术刊物，由中国社会科学院哲学研究所主办。《哲学动态》的基本任务和主要特色是：坚持以马克思主义为指导，立足于学术领先的理念；广泛提供国内外哲学界信息；反映哲学各学科的新动向、新问题、新成果；刊登哲学论文和研究资料；开展对哲学重大问题、现实问题和热点问题的讨论；倡导学术争鸣，开展规范、健康的学术批评和评论。

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